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Many emerging markets have undertaken significant financial sector reforms, especially in their bank-
ing sectors, that are critical for both financial development and real economic activity. In this paper, we
investigate the success of banking reforms in India where significant banking reforms were implemented
during the 1990s. Using the argument that well-functioning credit markets would reflect a credit channel
for monetary policy at work, we test whether a change in monetary policy has a predictable impact on
borrowing behaviour of several types of firms, including business group affiliated, unaffiliated private
firms, state-owned firms and foreign firms. The empirical results suggest that unaffiliated private firms
have the most vulnerable to monetary policy stance during tight policy regimes. We also find that during
tight monetary policy regimes, bank credit of smaller firms is more sensitive to changes in the interest rate
than that of large firms. In an easy money regime, monetary policy and the associated change in interest
rate does not affect change in bank credit, change in total debt and the proportion of bank credit in total
debt for any of the firms. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.
Keywords: banking reforms; monetary policy; credit markets; bank debt; debt structure
JEL codes: E52; G21; G28; G32; O16
1. Introduction
The correlation – some would argue causal relation – between financial development and eco-
nomic growth is well established, albeit with some caveats (King and Levine 1993; Demetriades
and Hussein 1996; Arestis and Demetriades 1997). Not surprisingly, over the past three decades,
a large number of developing countries (including their fast-growing subset, emerging market
economies) have undertaken reforms of their financial sector. While some of these reforms have
been aimed at reducing transactions cost and improving informational efficiency of equity mar-
kets (Lagoarde-Segot 2009), much of the reforms were aimed at the banking sectors of these
countries that have been the central pillars of their financial systems for decades (Abiad, Detra-
giache, and Tressel 2010; Ag˘ca and Celasun 2012). At the same time, for a variety of reasons,
corporate bond markets have remained underdeveloped in all but a handful – Brazil, China and
Malaysia – of emerging market economies (Tendulkar 2015; Burger, Warnock, and Warnock
2015).
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Banking sector reforms in these countries were largely aimed at reducing or eliminating
the constraints imposed on banks by interest rate controls, directed credit and pre-emption of
savings by the government, policies that are generally associated with financial repression (Fry
1997). Simultaneously, banks were accorded greater responsibility with respect to management
of credit risk, by way of prudential norms involving recognition of loan losses and maintenance
of adequate risk capital. Incumbent banks were also subjected to greater competition by way of
liberalisation of the rules and regulations about entry of new foreign and domestic banks. The
details of these changes to the banking landscape in emerging market economies have been dis-
cussed widely in the literature, in the context of countries such as China (Lardy 2008), India
(Bhaumik and Dimova 2004; Bhaumik and Piesse 2008), South Korea (Amsden and Euh 1993),
former communist economies of Soviet Union (Love and Rachinsky 2015; Cojocaru et al. 2016)
and Turkey (Akyuz 1990).
However, the economic reforms directed at the financial sectors of emerging market
economies are often incomplete, and significant market frictions remained. To begin with, the
informational cost in these countries remains high, as the corporate landscape continues to be
dominated by firms that had opaque ownership structures and entrenched management (Khanna
and Palepu 2000; Claessens and Fan 2002). The cost of contract enforcement remains high as
well, and in some cases the problem is further aggravated by weak or inadequate bankruptcy
laws (Kang and Nayar 2004). These characteristics of the credit market favour incumbent firms
that have proven track record and banking relationships (Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo 2004), those
that are able to post collateral or implicit and explicit guarantees of established firms within busi-
ness networks (Fisman and Wang 2010), and those with political connections (Khwaja and Mian
2005; Tsai et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2015). This does not mean, however, that banks in these
countries do not employ commercial judgement about credit allocation (Firth et al. 2009), and
the credit market frictions that favour incumbents and organisations such as business groups can
be ameliorated over time (Bhaumik, Das, and Kumbhakar 2012). However, not enough is under-
stood about the functioning of credit (more broadly, financial) markets as the different aspects of
the reforms packages pull the market participants in different directions.
In this paper, we draw implications about the success of banking sector reforms in emerging
market economies using the prism of monetary policy transmission in these economies. Mon-
etary theory suggests that informational frictions in credit markets worsen during tight money
periods (Bernanke and Gertler 1995), and this may have implications for both bank debt and
overall debt exposure of firms (Huang 2003). If banking reforms reduce overall informational
cost in the credit market, enhance the capacity and willingness of banks to better evaluate credit
applications, and make it easier to enforce credit contracts, then monetary policy should affect the
debt exposure of all types of firms similarly. However, if the threat of adverse selection remains
acute and enforcement of credit contracts remains difficult then firm that is better able to sig-
nal their quality or have their liabilities underwritten (e.g. large firms or older firms or business
group affiliated firms) may be less affected by monetary policy than their counterparts who do
not have these abilities. By examining the impact of monetary policy on debt exposures of dif-
ferent types of firms within the same institutional and regulatory context, therefore, we are able
to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of banking sector reforms in an emerging market
context.
For our empirical analysis, we choose the context of India where there was a significant and
well-documented progress in banking sector reforms from the early to the late nineties. In keep-
ing with the literature, we distinguish between easy and tight monetary regimes, the assumption
being that the impact of interest rate changes on volume and structure of debt is higher during
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Sh
eff
iel
d]
 at
 05
:43
 22
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
The European Journal of Finance 3
tight money regimes than in the easy money regimes. Our results suggest that unaffiliated pri-
vate firms have the most vulnerable to monetary policy stance during tight policy regimes where
other types of firms are relatively less affected by changes in monetary policy. We also find that
during tight monetary policy regimes, smaller firms are more affected by monetary policy than
larger firms; volume of bank loans of smaller firms is more sensitive to interest rate changes
than that of larger firms. Our results suggest that information costs and agency issues that were
highlighted by extant research (e.g. Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo 2004) have not been completely
ameliorated by banking sector reforms. They also have implications for complementary issues
such as low-cost bankruptcy proceedings and creditors’ rights that are only now being addressed
by the government. Our results, therefore, have implications for emerging market economies that
embark on banking sector reforms. They also have implications for developed country contexts,
such as Europe, that have experienced a rise in credit market frictions and where central banks
are simultaneously pursuing unorthodox monetary policy, at least in part to support private sector
investment and economic growth.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: our empirical strategy is discussed in Section 2.
In Section 3, we discuss the context of analysis. The data and the summary statistics are discussed
in Section 4, and the regression results and their implications are discussed in Section 5. Section
6 concludes.
2. Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is based on the argument that if credit markets work well then a change in
monetary policy should have a predictable impact on the borrowing patterns of firms.1 Specifi-
cally, a tightening of monetary policy should result in a reduction in the volume of total debt on
the balance sheet of an average firm (Bernanke and Gertler 1995; Oliner and Rudebusch 1996),
especially if bank loans that are the dominant source of finance in most economies, and emerging
markets in particular, cannot easily be substituted by other forms of debt. Further, this is more
likely to be the case during tight money regimes than during easy money regimes (Bhaumik,
Dang, and Kutan 2011), where the easiness or tightness of a monetary regime is indicated by an
indicator such as the monetary condition index (Osborne-Kinch and Holton 2010). The impact is
likely to be greater for smaller and younger firms that are often informationally less transparent
than their larger counterparts (Berger and Udell 1998, 2006). Finally, as the cost of bank finance
rises in the event of monetary tightening, relative to cost of capital from other sources, there
should be an impact of a firm’s debt structure, as captured by the ratio of bank debt to total debt
(Huang 2003).
However, these general propositions would have to be refined for developing country and
emerging market contexts. For example, given that firms in these countries are largely depen-
dent on bank capital and have significantly underdeveloped bond markets (Bose and Coondoo
2003), such that change in overall debt is largely driven by change in bank debt, the impact of
monetary policy on a firm’s debt structure may be weak or insignificant. Similarly, the impact of
monetary policy on bank loan itself is likely to be more significant for firms that are unaffiliated
to governments and organisational structures such as business groups. For example, state-owned
firms (and those with strong relations with the state) may be subjected to soft budget constraints
whereby liabilities are effectively written off by the state, if necessary (Kornai 1986; Meggin-
son, Ullah, and Wei 2014). They may also have preferential access to loans in these economies,
especially where the banking sector is dominated by state-owned banks (Girma, Gong, and Gorg
2008). By the same token, business group affiliated firms can (but are not guaranteed to) benefit
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from a commitment to mutually insuring related firms within the same business group against
financial difficulties (Chang and Hong 2000; Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton 2003; Khanna and
Yafeh 2005), which can enhance their credit worthiness.
In other words, in developing economy and emerging market contexts, it would be prudent to
focus on the impact of monetary policy on these unaffiliated firms, and contrast this impact with
the impact of monetary policy on business group affiliated and state-owned firms. If banking
sector reforms result in a level playing field and reduction in frictions in the credit market then
there should be no observable difference between the impact of monetary policy on growth in
bank credit and debt structure of unaffiliated firms and those of the firms in the aforementioned
comparator groups. Continued presence of frictions, on the other hand, would result in a greater
impact of monetary policy on unaffiliated firms than on business group affiliated and state-owned
firms. Similarly, following Berger and Udell (1998, 2006), and accounting for a host of factors
such as absence of credit registers, weak bankruptcy laws and weak credit protection, in general,
we should expect monetary policy to have a greater impact on smaller (younger) firms than on
larger (older) firms. Following Bhaumik, Dang, and Kutan (2011), this impact is likely to be
greater during periods of tight monetary policy than during periods of easy monetary policy.
In order to operationalise the empirical framework, following Huang (2003), we propose that
a representative firm faces a choice between bank credit and bond finance, and that this choice
is affected by the relative price of debt from these two sources. The firm’s choice function,
therefore, is given by
min C = rBB + rN N − f (B/D)D subject to B + N = D
where C is the cost of borrowing, rBB and rN N are interest payment on bank debt and non-bank
debt (or bonds),2 and f is a (concave) function that captures the benefits of relationship banking
associated with bank borrowing that can partly offset the cost of bank loans. It is easy to see
that, within this framework, monetary policy affects the spread between the cost of bank and
non-bank debt, and thereby affects both the stock of these two sources of debt and the structure
of the firm’s debt, namely, the proportion of bank debt in total debt. As mentioned above, the
impact of monetary policy is likely to be greater during tight money periods.
Huang (2003) argues that, in particular, the impact of monetary policy on bank debt, total debt
and debt structure of firms can be estimated using the following regression models:
BDi,t = α0 + α1BDi,t−1 + α2FtT + α3Ft(1 − T) + ′X + μt + ϑi + i,t (1)
Bi,t = γ0 + γ1Bi,t−1 + γ2FtT + γ3Ft(1 − T) +  ′X + μt + ϑi + i,t (2)
Di,t = β0 + β1Di,t−1 + β2FtT + β3Ft(1 − T) + 
′X + μt + ϑi + i,t (3)
where BD is the ratio of bank debt to total debt, B is the logarithm of the stock of bank debt,
D is the logarithm of the stock of total debt, F is the logarithm of the interest rate indicator of
monetary policy, T is a binary indicator of tight monetary conditions and correspondingly (1 – T)
is a binary indicator of easy monetary conditions, X is a vector of other firm characteristics that
can affect a firm’s debt structure and levels of total and bank debt themselves. The indicator T
is created using the monetary conditioning index for the context of analysis.3 Depending on the
regression model, X includes logarithm of inventory (N) and logarithm of gearing (G) which is
measured by the debt-to-asset ratio. Finally, µ and ϑ are time and firm fixed effects, respectively,
and  is the iid error term.
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Given the dynamic nature of the equations, these equations have to be estimated using varia-
tion of the generalised method of moments (GMM) approach proposed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We estimate these models for different ownership cate-
gories, firm sizes and firm age. Based on our prior discussion, we propose that if banking sector
reforms do not eliminate or significantly reduce credit market frictions, such that problems of
adverse selection and contract enforceability are still significant, then monetary policy will affect
(bank and non-bank) debt and debt structure of different types of firms differently. Specifically,
those firms that are less capable of signaling credit worthiness, or are viewed as higher credit risk,
would experience a greater change in their debt levels and debt structure than their counterparts.
Given the context of analysis, this would enable us to draw some conclusions about whether a
given set of policies aimed at reforming the banking sector are sufficient and, if they are not,
speculate about the types of additional policies/reforms that might be necessary.
3. Context of analysis
The modern history of Indian banking arguably starts in 1969, when the Government of India
nationalised the banks, in part as a response to a spate of bank failures, and in part to usher in an
era of social banking that could facilitate economic development. The banks operated within an
environment of financial repression characterised by administered interest rates, mandatory loan
syndication, and pre-emption of their deposit base by the government in the form of measures
such as high statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) that required banks to invest a significant proportion
of their resources in government and quasi-government bonds (Sen and Vaidya 1998). At the
same time, the thrust on social banking led to a large-scale expansion of the banking network in
India, with the nationalised banks adding over 55,000 branches between 1969 and 1990.
However, while the social agenda of the bank may have been a success, the Indian banking
sector in the early 1990s was in distress. While the gross operating profit of scheduled commer-
cial banks rose from 0.8 per cent (of assets) in the 1970s to about 1.5 per cent in the 1990s, net
profit of the banks had declined sharply. There was also serious concern about accumulation of
non-performing assets (NPAs), especially among the state-owned banks that accounted for about
88 per cent of the assets of the banking sector. Further, the pro-market reforms initiated by the
government in 1991 were incompatible with the financial repression that characterised the bank-
ing sector. Hence, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) initiated banking sector reforms in 1992,
based on the recommendations of Narasimham Committee I.
The reforms had three main pillars (Sarkar, Sarkar, and Bhaumik 1998; Bhaumik and Dimova
2004; Bhaumik and Piesse 2008). First, the banking sector was subjected to greater competition.
Incumbent private and foreign-owned banks were allowed to expand their branching network
and new banks were permitted to enter the market. Second, banks were granted much greater
autonomy over disbursal of credit and the pricing of credit. The cash reserve ratio (CRR) and the
SLR were reduced sharply between 1992 and 1997, from 15 per cent to 10 per cent, and from
38.5 per cent to 25 per cent, respectively. By 1993, the loan threshold above which syndication
was mandatory was raised from INR 50 million to INR 500 million, and by 1997 most quanti-
tative restrictions related to mandatory syndication and disbursal of term loans were removed.
By 1998, banks were free to determine the lending rates of all loans, with the understanding
that lending rates of loans of up to INR 200,000 would not exceed the declared prime lending
rate (PLR) of banks. Finally, banks were subjected to prudential regulations that were modelled
on the recommendations of the Basle committee. Specifically, banks were required to maintain
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6 S.K. Bhaumik et al.
appropriate levels of risk-weighted capital, recognise bad loans early, in accordance with the
norms laid down by the RBI, and write off NPAs.
In 1998, the RBI initiated the second generation of banking reforms, in keeping with
the recommendations of Narasimham Committee II. The most important recommendation of
the Committee was the creation of asset reconstruction companies (ARCs) to simultaneously
improve the quality of the balance sheets of the banks and to facilitate recovery of loans. In a
separate development, after a prolonged period of legal disputes, debt recovery tribunals (DRTs)
began functioning in India, in earnest, by 1999. In other words, the RBI was attempting to simul-
taneously strengthen the balance sheets of the banks and to put in place institutions that would
add to the capability of banks to implement the debt contracts that lie at the very heart of the
process of financial intermediation and delegated monitoring.
In many ways, the reforms were having the expected impact on the Indian banking sector.
The Indian banking sector witnessed the entry of new private banks such as Axis Bank and
HDFC Bank, and there was an expansion of the branch network of both private and foreign
banks. As a consequence, there was a noticeable decline in the market share of state-owned
banks over time and unsurprisingly this was accompanied by greater competition (Zhao, Casu,
and Ferrari 2010). This, in turn, led to technological progress driven productivity growth in
the Indian banking sector, albeit at a greater rate for foreign banks than for their domestic
counterparts (Casu, Ferrari, and Zhao 2013). Reforms related to DRTs also had the desired
impact on loan repayment likelihood (Visaria 2009). However, the evidence about credit allo-
cation is less encouraging. Bhaumik and Piesse (2008) found that in large measure bank-level
credit disbursal in India is explained by past allocation of credit. This is consistent with con-
tract level evidence, albeit from a single large state-owned bank, that suggests that loans were
still being made on the basis of past loan sizes rather than on the basis of potential (Baner-
jee, Cole, and Duflo 2004). In part, this conservativeness can be explained by factors such
as expected political cost of bad loans, or by low managerial ability to identify good lending
opportunities (even though information that have recently come to light about the extent of bad
loans in the Indian banking sector suggests that we should discount the former argument signif-
icantly4). But alternative, and equally plausible, arguments include persistent high information
cost, and the risks associated with lending to firms with entrenched management (which has
negative implications for governance quality), especially in a context where bankruptcy cost is
high (Kang and Nayar 2004).5 In such an environment, state-owned firms that have close rela-
tionship with the still dominant state-owned banks and organisational forms such as business
groups that are optimised to operate efficiently in contexts of missing markets and weak formal
institutions may have an advantage over standalone private firms, even though the credit market
advantage of the business groups may have declined over time (Bhaumik, Das, and Kumbhakar
2012).
The suitability of the Indian context for our empirical exercise is easy to see. On the one hand,
greater autonomy of the dominant state-owned banks and greater competition in the banking
sector and existence of a large number of privately owned firms suggests that the credit channel
of monetary policy transmission might be operating in a way that is consistent with theoretical
propositions. There is some empirical support for this line of argument (Bhaumik, Dang, and
Kutan 2011). At the same time, the corporate landscape is characterised by firms with a wide
range of ownership, size and age, and there is some evidence to suggest that some of these firms
might have easier access to credit than others. Finally, the Indian central bank, the RBI, has
been active in the monetary policy sphere, thereby impacting the cost of bank credit. Hence, our
empirical strategy is meaningful in the Indian context.
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4. Data and summary statistics
4.1 Firm-level data
The firm-level data have been obtained from the Prowess database marketed by Centre for Mon-
itoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), which is widely used for firm-level analysis in the Indian
context (Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru 2007; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). The database includes
data reported in financial statements, including detailed breakdown of sources of bank and non-
bank credit. It also includes information about firm characteristics such as inventory and gearing,
i.e. the variables included in Equations (1)–(3), and ownership information such as business
group affiliation and state ownership. It also provides information on industry affiliation of firms.
Further, the data are available for a fairly long time series, thereby facilitating panel analysis.
We focus, in particular, on the 2001–2006 period. As discussed earlier in this paper, the major
reforms initiatives in the Indian banking context were initiated during the 1990s. Hence, the
impact of reforms on the credit market should have become apparent by 2001. At the other end
of the time line, 2006 is the last year for which we have estimates of the monetary conditioning
index for India which facilitates the choice between tight and easy money regimes. This, how-
ever, is not very restrictive, given that 2008 is anyhow a watershed year for the global financial
system beyond which it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of pervasive uncertainty
and weak recovery of the global economy from the factors discussed in the previous section.
After accounting for missing information in the firm-level data, we are left with an unbalanced
panel of 1347 business group affiliated firms, 3273 unaffiliated private firms, 178 state-owned
firms (including a handful of joint ventures (JVs) between state-owned firms and private firms)
and 238 foreign firms. Over the sample period, they account for 5121, 10,282, 618 and 843
firm-years, respectively. The rationale for combining JVs involving state-owned firms is that
in emerging market economies with large state-owned banking sectors partnership with the
government should provide privileged access to credit, close to or at par with state-owned firms.
4.2 Monetary policy and monetary regime
As mentioned above, the monetary policy authority in India is RBI, the central bank. The RBI
was established under the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934, as a private shareholders’ bank,
and was nationalised in 1949, after India’s independence. From the outset, the RBI did not have
de jure independence from the government of India, and this was largely manifested through the
automatic monetisation of ad hoc treasury bills. As pointed out by Reddy (1999), this problem
was particularly acute during the 1980s when ‘[t]he process of creating 91-day ad hoc Treasury
bills and subsequently funding them into non-marketable special securities at a very low interest
rate emerged as the principal source of monetary expansion’ (100). This process undermined the
stated principle of effective control of the monetary base that was enshrined in the high-profile
Chakravarty Committee Report.6
However, under an agreement between the government and the RBI, the automatic moneti-
sation process was stopped from 1 April 1997, and while the central bank continued to lack de
jure independence during the sample period, this gave the RBI greater control over monetary
policy. Specifically, as noted by Bhattacharya (2006), it has been argued that while the RBI has
to strike a balance between price stability and growth, the political economy tilts the balance
in favour of price stability such that the central bank has an ‘informal’ mandate to maintain
an acceptable level of inflation. Specifically, ‘[t]he institutional arrangement . . . . represented a
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reasonable degree of statutory autonomy in the case of India – at least within the group of devel-
oping countries whose overall policy framework yielded little operational independence to their
central banks’ (Bhattacharya 2006, 77).
In the post-agreement period, the RBI has used a number of different policy instruments to
signal its monetary policy stance. The CRR, which came down steadily from 15 per cent in the
early 1990s to 5 per cent by 2004, was more useful for direct monetary targeting and hence less
useful in the post-agreement period. However, its use was not completely abandoned during the
sample period. Since 1998, the central bank has signaled its monetary policy stance using short-
term interest rates, in particular, the repo and reverse repo rates. As demonstrated by Bhaumik,
Dang, and Kutan (2011), while this makes it difficult to use a specific indicator of monetary pol-
icy in the Indian context, the co-movement of the average PLRs of the five largest banks makes
it a reasonable indicator of monetary policy. We, therefore, use this average PLR to compute F,
the (logarithm of) interest rate indicator of monetary policy. We also use the indictor of tight and
easy money regimes used by Bhaumik, Dang, and Kutan (2011), which is based on the monetary
conditioning index for India estimated by Kannan, Sanyal, and Bhoi (2006).7
4.3 Summary statistics
Summary statistics on credit and capital market access of the firms are reported in Table 1. The
information reported in the table suggests the following:
a. India has a bank-based financial system, with banks accounting for roughly half the credit
obtained by business group affiliated firms, unaffiliated firms and foreign firms. Indeed, only
about 9–13 per cent of business group affiliated firms, state-owned firms and foreign firms,
and only about 3 per cent of unaffiliated firms have access to capital/bond markets. This is
consistent with the evidence that highlights the persistence of the underdeveloped status of
the Indian corporate bond market (Bose and Coondoo 2003; Khanna and Varottil 2012).
b. There is a fairly significant market for inter-corporate lending. Indeed, firms of all ownership
types borrow (nearly) as much from subsidiaries and corporate bodies, in percentage terms,
as from non-bank financial institutions. For example, even unaffiliated private firms that are
not part of business group internal capital markets borrow 8.71 per cent from subsidiaries and
corporate bodies, and a comparable 9.09 per cent from non-bank financial institutions.
c. Contrary to popular wisdom, state-owned firms do not obtain the majority of their credit from
the (largely state-owned) banking system. Bank credit accounts for only 31.53 per cent of
the credit that they obtain. Much of their credit is obtained directly from the government
(25.99 per cent) or from subsidiaries and corporate bodies (18.44 per cent) whose own-
ership cannot be identified from the data but those that are likely to be other state-owned
firms.
d. While state-owned firms and foreign firms are able to obtain unsecured credit relatively eas-
ily – nearly half or more of the credit obtained by these firms is unsecured, collateralised
credit accounts for about 70 per cent of the credit obtained by the vast majority of the firms,
whether business group affiliated or unaffiliated. Bank credit accounts for 71–93 per cent of
this collaterised debt. Since collateral is meant to be a signal to overcome adverse selection
problems (Bester 1985, 1987), this suggests that the Indian credit market is characterised by
significant adverse selection, perhaps, in part, because of opacity of firms with concentrated
ownership and organisational structures such as business groups (Claessens and Fan 2002;
Bhaumik and Dimova 2014).8
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e. Finally, despite progressive liberalisation/convertibility of the capital account of balance of
payments, a very small proportion of the firms access overseas credit and capital markets.
Indeed, even for foreign firms, which have nearly double the proportion of foreign currency
debt compared to their nearest domestic competitors (8.33 per cent vs. 4.29 per cent), the
business group affiliated firms, foreign current debt account less than a tenth of total debt.9
The above statistics about external financing of the firms in our sample have implications for
our empirical analysis. The strong prima facie evidence for adverse selection in the Indian credit
market suggests that monetary policy may have a significant impact on disbursal of bank credit,
especially during periods of tight monetary regimes. Given that state-owned banks evidently
have a safety net in the form of government borrowing, and given that the inter-corporate credit
market is much more reliable for business group affiliated firms than for unaffiliated firms, the
aforementioned impact of monetary policy is likely to be greater for unaffiliated firms than for
their business group affiliated and state-owned domestic competitors. However, while the num-
bers reported in Table 1 have implications for bank credit, they do not tell us much about overall
corporate debt, nor about the proportion of bank credit in total debt, which remains an open
empirical question.
In Table 2, we report the summary statistics of the variables we use for the regression analysis.
We report these statistics for all the firms in our sample, and separately for the business group
affiliated and private independent firms that are dominant in our sample, accounting for 91.33
per cent of the firm-year observations. Further, we report the statistics separately for the easy
money regime and tight money regime. The figures reported in this table suggest that, for the
sample period in question, the interest rate declined, on average, during both the easy and tight
money regimes. Correspondingly, there was an increase in bank loans for the firms in both these
monetary regimes, but the magnitude of this increase was different for business group affiliated
and private independent firms. There is also a difference in the change in the ratio of bank loans
Table 1. Sources of credit.
Business group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private firms
State-owned firms
(including JVs)
Foreign
firms
Proportion borrowed from bank
(%)
50.77 58.07 31.53 48.49
Proportion borrowed from
financial institutions (%)
11.39 9.09 5.67 5.44
Proportion of borrowing that is
secured (%)
69.67 71.58 43.43 53.19
Proportion of secured borrowing
that is from banks (%)
93.72 71.58 91.53 80.64
Proportion of borrowing
from subsidiaries and other
corporate bodies (%)
12.09 8.71 18.44 12.01
Proportion of borrowing from
governments (%)
1.06 0.78 25.99 2.11
Proportion of foreign currency
debt (%)
4.29 2.46 2.73 8.33
Proportion of firms with access
to capital markets (%)
13.59 2.96 9.30 9.43
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Easy money regime Tight money regime
All firms
Business group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private All firms
Business group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private
(B/D)t 0.089 0.055 0.115 0.008 − 0.014 0.029
(0.622) (0.646) (0.568) (0.485) (0.479) (0.445)
Bt 0.108 0.077 0.137 0.034 0.028 0.064
(0.895) (0.947) (0.818) (0.756) (0.736) (0.667)
Nt 0.092 0.084 0.096 − 0.022 − 0.018 − 0.022
(0.529) (0.502) (0.555) (0.505) (0.419) (0.564)
Gt − 0.011 − 0.025 0.002 − 0.051 − 0.070 − 0.034
(0.579) (0.599) (0.526) (0.467) (0.460) (0.427)
Ft − 0.025 − 0.026 − 0.025 − 0.026 − 0.026 − 0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Note: The table reports the means and (within parentheses) the standard deviations of the variables used in our analysis
(Equations (1)–(3)), for the relevant sample of firms – all, business group affiliated and unaffiliated private, for the easy
and tight money regimes.
to total loans of these two types of firms, in both the easy and tight money regimes. While
these figures do not tell us conclusively how monetary policy affects bank debt and the ratio of
bank debt to total debt, nor whether the impact of monetary policy differs between the easy and
tight money regimes, they do provide prima facie evidence of a relationship between a change
in interest rate and the aforementioned debt-related variables. These figures also suggest that it
would be meaningful to examine this relationship separately for firms with different ownerships,
which lies at the heart of our empirical strategy.
5. Regression results
At the outset, we considered the use of panel unit root test for the data. The restrictive assump-
tions made by the stylised panel unit root tests and the low power of these tests have been widely
discussed in the literature (e.g. Karlsson and Lothgren 2000; Choi 2001; Strauss and Yigit 2003).
Further, given a sample period of six years, which is further reduced on account of differenc-
ing and use of a lagged dependent variable, any test for panel unit roots is not meaningful. Our
perusal of the finance literature suggests that the use of panel unit root tests is not stylised (e.g.
Huang 2003; Hennessy 2004; Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen 2009; Wintoki, Linck, and Netter
2012). Hence, we proceeded to the estimation of the regression models without testing for panel
unit roots.10
To begin with, we estimate Equations (1)–(3) for the dominant business group affiliated and
private independent firms, without any interaction between the monetary policy variable and the
easy and tight money regimes. Since these are baseline regressions, we report the coefficient
of only the monetary policy variable in Table 3. Consistent with our observation in Table 2, a
change in interest rate is seen to be inversely related to the change in bank debt and total debt
of independent private firms, but not for business group affiliated firms. There is no impact of a
change in interest rate on the ratio of bank debt to total debt of either type of firms. More impor-
tantly, however, since interest rate declined, and bank and total debt increased, on average, for
both types of firms, in both the easy and tight money regimes, it is not obvious as to whether the
result is driven by the firm-year observations in the easy or the tight money years in the sample.
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Table 3. Baseline regressions (without monetary policy regime interaction).
(B/D)t Bt Dt
Business
group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private firms
Business
group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private firms
Business
group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private firms
Ft − 0.44 − 0.66 − 1.99 − 7.54** 2.48 − 7.13***
(0.66) (0.45) (2.76) (3.00) (3.10) (2.54)
Note: The baseline regression specification did not include the interactions between T and (1 – T) with Ft . The models
were estimated using system GMM. In almost all cases, the conditions related to AR(2) and the Hansen J statistic were
met. The full regression results are available upon request. The values within parentheses are robust standard errors.
** and *** indicate significance at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
The baseline regression, however, reinforces two of our priors, namely, that monetary policy has
an impact on firm debt in at least one of the monetary regimes, and that there may be differ-
ences in the impact of monetary policy on firm debt (and perhaps also debt structure) of firms
with different ownership. We, therefore, proceed with our empirical strategy which differentiates
Table 4. Impact of monetary policy on debt structure.
Dependent variable: Ratio of bank debt to total debt (B/D)t
Business group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private firms
State-owned firms
(including JV)
Foreign
firms
(B/D)t−1 0.97*** 0.98*** 1.05*** 1.01***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08)
Nt 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.004 − 0.007
(0.01) (0.007) (0.03) (0.04)
Gt 0.04** 0.04*** 0.003 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Ft × Easy money − 1.63 − 1.25 0.57 0.92
(0.99) (0.79) (1.41) (2.12)
Ft × Tight money − 0.03 − 0.39 0.11 0.34
(0.73) (0.45) (0.47) (1.90)
AR(2) 0.60 0.96 0.65 1.95*
(Prob > z) (0.54) (0.33) (0.51) (0.052)
Hansen statistic 22.97 23.04 16.59 17.22
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.23) (0.23) (0.61) (0.57)
Difference-in-Hansen
GMM instruments 10.80 11.27 9.54 7.91
(Prob > ch-sq) (0.21) (0.18) (0.29) (0.44)
IV 1.00 1.01 0.76 3.16
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.60) (0.60) (0.68) (0.20)
Wald chi-sq 34751.08 90618.79 2679.11 3139.66
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of firms 1347 3273 178 238
Number of obs. 5121 10282 618 843
Note: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5
per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Impact of monetary policy on volume of bank loans.
Dependent variable: Change in volume of bank loans, Bt
Business group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private firms
State-owned firms
(including JV)
Foreign
firms
Bt−1 0.10 − 0.19 − 0.61*** − 0.44
(0.20) (0.18) (0.16) (0.48)
Nt 0.35*** 0.24*** − 0.47 0.18
(0.09) (0.03) (0.35) (0.45)
BDt−1 0.17 0.19 − 0.46 − 0.36
(0.19) (0.13) (0.49) (0.56)
Ft × Easy money 2.29 − 1.39 − 9.81 − 1.02
(4.51) (3.77) (9.21) (13.14)
Ft × Tight money − 10.66 * − 19.21 *** − 13.92 23.59
(5.89) (4.49) (15.52) (29.58)
AR(2) 0.84 − 0.14 − 2.01 0.09
(Prob > z) (0.40) (0.89) (0.04) (0.92)
Hansen statistic 12.94 7.93 7.93 5.10
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.07) (0.34) (0.34) (0.65)
Difference-in-Hansen
GMM instruments(Prob > ch-sq) 10.78 5.47 1.54 2.78
(0.03) (0.24) (0.81) (0.59)
IV 3.08 1.49 4.88 1.75
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.21) (0.47) (0.09) (0.41)
Wald chi-sq 53.67 177.72 51.83 10.72
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Number of firms 1060 2247 118 161
Number of obs. 3314 6073 337 419
Note: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent,
5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
between impact of monetary policy in easy and tight money regimes, and also estimates the
aforementioned equations separately for firms of all ownership types.
The regression results are reported in Tables 4–7. In Tables 4, 5 and 6, we report the estimates
for Equations (1)–(3). In each of these tables, we report the estimates separately for the four
different ownership types in our sample. In Table 7, we explore further the impact of monetary
policy on unaffiliated firms that are most likely to be affected by such policy. Specifically, we
compare the relative impact on larger (those bigger than median) and smaller (those smaller
than median) firms, and older (pre-1990) and younger (post-1990) firms. Finally, for each table
and the regression models therein, we report the test statistics for the null hypotheses involving
AR(2) and the appropriateness of the GMM instruments (Hansen J statistic). The null hypothesis
regarding AR(2) is rejected only for foreign firms in Table 2, and the null hypothesis for the
Hansen statistic is not rejected at the 5 per cent level for any of the regression models in any
of the tables.11 We also report the difference-in-Hansen statistics for the main regression results
(Tables 4–6), and in almost all cases the null hypothesis that the specified variables are proper
instruments could not be rejected. This gives us confidence about the validity of our instruments
and hence about the regression estimates reported in the tables.
Let us first focus on the impact of monetary policy, and focus on the domestic firms which
are more reliant on the domestic credit market than the foreign firms. In Tables 4–6, in an easy
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Table 6. Impact of monetary policy on volume of total debt.
Dependent variable: Change in volume of total debt, Dt
Business group
affiliated
Unaffiliated
private firms
State-owned firms
(including JV)
Foreign
firms
Dt−1 − 0.11 − 0.05 − 0.10 − 0.84
(0.15) (0.20) (0.37) (0.56)
Nt 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.23** − 0.01
(0.06) (0.03) (0.11) (0.23)
BDt−1 0.24 0.09 − 0.04 − 0.15
(0.18) (0.11) (0.31) (0.59)
Ft × Easy money 4.33 − 2.49 0.82 2.84
(3.85) (2.84) (4.64) (11.60)
Ft × Tight money − 6.65 − 16.64*** − 0.66 11.91
(11.26) (4.14) (5.11) (19.18)
AR(2) − 0.70 0.38 1.22 − 0.70
(Prob > z) (0.48) (0.71) (0.22) (0.48)
Hansen statistic 3.53 4.20 5.10 1.21
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.83) (0.75) (0.65) (0.87)
Difference-in-Hansen
GMM instruments 1.26 2.56 2.77 1.21
(Prob > ch-sq) (0.86) (0.63) (0.59) (0.87)
IV 0.70 2.06 0.44 0.38
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.70) (0.35) (0.80) (0.82)
Wald chi-sq 43.72 185.99 4.98 12.20
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.03)
Number of firms 1176 2494 147 202
Number of obs. 3713 6832 433 596
Note: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent,
5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
money regime, monetary policy and the associated change in interest rate does not affect change
in bank credit, change in total debt and the proportion of bank credit in total debt for any of the
firms. This is consistent with the results in Bhaumik, Dang, and Kutan (2011) which suggest that
over the same period bank lending in India was, by and large, unaffected by monetary policy, in
an easy money regime. Monetary policy does have an impact on change in bank credit and total
debt during a tight money regime – a rise in interest rates leads to a reduction in both bank credit
(Table 5) and total debt (Table 6), proportion of bank credit in total debt is unaffected (Table 4) –
but only for the unaffiliated private firms. As discussed earlier in the paper, this is perhaps to
be expected; unaffiliated (or independent) private firms that do not have the benefit of mutual
insurance of business groups and state support enjoyed by state-owned firms are more likely to be
affected by monetary policy. It also suggests that despite the decline in the efficiency of business
group structures in reducing financial constraints since the turn of the century (Bhaumik, Das, and
Kumbhakar 2012), mechanisms such as internal capital markets (more broadly, inter-corporate
networks in credit markets) were still relevant in the Indian context.
In Table 7, we focus on the unaffiliated private firms that seem to be most vulnerable to mone-
tary policy initiatives during tight money regimes, with attendant implications for their access to
bank (and non-bank) credit relative to their business group affiliated and state-owned domestic
counterparts. Specifically, we focus on age and size which, following Berger and Udell (1998,
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Table 7. Impact of monetary policy on volume of bank loans – unaffiliated private companies.
Dependent variable: Change in volume of bank loans, Bt
Differentiated by size Differentiated by age
Larger firms Smaller firms Pre-1990 firms Post-1990 firms
Bt−1 − 0.07 − 0.49 − 0.02 − 0.30
(0.14) (0.41) (0.22) (0.25)
Nt 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
BDt−1 0.16 0.32 0.25* 0.19
(0.12) (0.36) (0.15) (0.20)
Ft × Easy money − 3.25 6.46 3.13 − 4.22
(3.63) (12.12) (3.95) (6.04)
Ft × Tight money − 17.42*** − 23.71*** − 12.32*** − 13.38**
(4.72) (8.37) (3.69) (6.67)
AR(2) 0.30 − 0.86 0.37 − 0.60
(Prob > z) (0.764) (0.38) (0.71) (0.55)
Hansen statistic 7.61 14.06 8.73 7.37
(Prob > chi-sq) (0.37) (0.05) (0.27) (0.39)
Number of firms 1403 844 1467 780
Number of obs. 4109 1964 4118 1955
Note: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent,
5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
2006), are reasonable proxies for information cost associated with firms. The results suggest
that during tight money regimes, smaller firms (coefficient of − 23.71) are much more affected
by monetary policy (i.e. interest rate changes) than large firms (coefficient of − 17.42). This is
consistent with the popular and policy concern about smaller firms finding it more difficult to
access bank credit than larger firms. However, there is no significant difference in the impact
of monetary policy on changes in bank credit of pre-1990 and post-1990 firms (coefficients
of − 12.32 vs − 13.38).12
The coefficient estimates for the other variables have the expected signs. In Tables 4 and 5,
an increase in inventory holdings is associated with an increase in bank debt and bank loans
for business group affiliated and unaffiliated private firms but not for state-owned and foreign
firms, while in Table 6, we observe that higher inventories raise total debt for all firms except
foreign firms. In Tables 5 and 6, bank debt last period has no predictive power for bank loans
or total debt. Regarding lagged dependent variables, we see significant persistency in bank debt
ratio in Table 4, while no persistency in Tables 5 and 6 for volumes of bank debt and total debt.
Interestingly, in Table 5, we observe significant persistency only for the state-owned firms; a high
volume of bank loan on the balance sheet of the average state-owned firm in the previous period
is associated with a decline in the volume of bank loans in the current period.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
Given the widespread evidence about correlation (even causality) between banking sector devel-
opment and economic growth, it is not surprising that many emerging market economies are
advised to undertake suitable banking sector reforms, and indeed many of them such as India
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have ushered in a wide set of reforms over a period of time. However, while there is a large
literature on the impact of these reforms on performance of banks, often distinguishing between
banks of different ownership, there is considerably less understanding of the impact of these
reforms on the process of financial intermediation. In this paper, we examine the impact of bank-
ing sector reforms on financial intermediation using the prism of monetary policy transmission.
We argue that if banking sector reforms remove frictions in the credit market, this should be
reflected in the credit channel of transmission of monetary policy. In particular, monetary policy
should not affect firms of different ownership types – some of which are better capable of func-
tioning in markets with frictions while others are not – differently, nor should it have significantly
different effects on firms at different points of age and size distributions.
We examine these propositions in the Indian context which is characterised by both significant
banking sector reforms and existence of different types of firms, some of which have advantages
over others with respect to mitigating credit market frictions. Our empirical results suggest, in
an easy money regime, that monetary policy and the associated change in interest rate do not
affect change in bank credit, change in total debt and the proportion of bank credit in total debt
for any of the firms. This is consistent with extant literature on the credit channel transmission of
monetary policy in India (Bhaumik, Dang, and Kutan 2011). However, in a tight policy regime,
private firms that neither have state backing nor are affiliated with business groups are most
affected by monetary policy, in comparison with other types of firms. We also find that during
tight monetary policy regimes, smaller firms are more affected by monetary policy than larger
firms; the volume of bank loans of the former is more sensitive to changes in the interest rate.
Our empirical results have two important policy implications. First, there is some evidence of a
credit channel for monetary policy at work, especially when taken together with related evidence
in the literature (e.g. Bhaumik, Dang and Kutan 2011), suggesting some success of banking sec-
tor reforms in India. In other words, greater competition, greater autonomy with respect to loan
disbursal and pricing of loans, subjecting banks to prudential norms, and establishing mecha-
nisms for contract enforcement are all reforms worth exploring in emerging market contexts.
Second, banking sector reforms alone are clearly not sufficient to mitigate credit market frictions
that give some kinds of firms (such as those affiliated to business groups or the state) an advan-
tage over others, an advantage that can lead to misallocation of credit. To overcome the residual
frictions, governments may have to supplement banking sector reforms with wider reforms with
respect to bankruptcy laws and corporate governance, thereby eschewing the silo-based approach
to banking sector reforms.
Our results have implications not only for emerging market economies but also for devel-
oped contexts such as Europe. Since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis and the associated
banking crisis in the Euro area, the European Central Bank has pursued expansionary monetary
policy. While the objective of this policy is, in part, to provide liquidity to the banking system
and thereby stave off a systemic crisis, in part it is also a policy reaction to the weak growth
fundamentals in the Euro area. However, data available from the FRED database of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis suggest that, with the exception of a couple of quarters of 2014–2015,
the growth of credit to the private non-financial sector (adjusted for breaks) has been muted.
The frictions in the credit channel of transmission of monetary policy within the Euro area have
been highlighted in policy publications of organisations like the OECD (2015). This could be on
account of a number of factors such as accumulation of NPAs on the balance sheets of banks,
excessive leverage on the balance sheets of firms, and inability of some firms (SMEs in par-
ticular) to signal their credit worthiness. Our results provide insight into how transmission of
monetary policy can be affected by the aforementioned frictions, and thereby contribute to the
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policy debate about the efficacy of persisting with unorthodox monetary policy in the years to
come.
As with all research, however, ours has its own limitation. In large measure, this limitation is
similar to the one that is applicable to much of empirical research, especially those about emerg-
ing market economies that experience a large number of policy initiatives and reforms within
a relatively short period of time. Since these initiatives and reforms can concurrently impact
behaviour of financial and non-financial firms, it is difficult to isolate the impact of individual
policy initiatives/reforms and thereby estimate the marginal impact of these initiatives/reforms.
In the future, therefore, it would be interesting to see whether introduction of (isolated but) com-
plementary policy changes/reforms to bankruptcy law etc. have the expected or desired impact
on emerging market banking sectors. Specifically, one can then ask the question as to whether
these isolated, and hence easily identifiable, policy events improve the transmission of monetary
policy through the credit markets. Events such as the introduction of the new bankruptcy law in
India can be used as natural experiments for such empirical investigations.
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Notes
1. As argued by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), ‘monetary policy affects not only the general level of interest rates,
but also the size of the external finance premium’ (35), and two different mechanisms link monetary policy and
the size of this premium. On the one hand, contractionary monetary policy can reduce the loanable funds available
with banks, especially if bank deposits cannot easily be replaced by alternative instruments such as certificates of
deposit. Consequently, the importance of efficiently distributing available loanable funds increases considerably and,
at the same time, changes to the interest rate affect the likelihood of adverse selection. On the other hand, during
periods of contractionary monetary policy, the borrowers experience rising interest rate cost and declining value of
collateral, given the inverse relationship between interest rates and value of a wide range of assets. While both these
mechanisms suggest that credit flows and, by extension, the volume of bank debt on the balance sheets of firms are
affected by monetary policy, it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of the two channels on credit disbursal
and firm borrowing. In the words of Bernanke and Gertler (1995), ‘we are more confident in the existence of a credit
channel in general than we are in our ability to distinguish between the two mechanisms of the credit channel’ (42).
2. Correspondingly, B is bank debt, N is non-bank debt (or bonds) and D is total debt.
3. Bhaumik, Dang, and Kutan (2011) provide the following explanation as to why it is necessary to separately iden-
tify the monetary policy stance of the central bank and the monetary policy regime within which the policy is
implemented:
a given change in interest rates cannot have the same impact in a tight and easy monetary regime; a 50 basis
point increase in the interest is likely to have a different impact on loan distribution when the initial value of
the interest rate is (say) 8%, compared to the case when the initial value of the interest rate is (say) 2% (2422).
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4. See, for example, Bad bank loans undermine India’s growth hopes (Financial Times, February 18, 2016). Questions
are also being raised about the prudence of lending large sums of money to highly leveraged companies such as
Kingfisher Airlines.
5. A new bankruptcy law was passed by the Indian Parliament in 2016, but its enforcement may take time and its
efficiency is as-yet untested. See, for example, What India’s new bankruptcy law means (The Wall Street Journal,
May 12, 2016).
6. Formally, this was known as the Report of the Committee to Review the Working of the Monetary System, and it was
submitted to the RBI in 1985.
7. There is a well-established literature on the monetary conditioning index, and it is fairly technical. Since the estima-
tion of the index is not the focus of this paper, we abstract from a detailed discussion of this index. The details can
be found in the references cited in our paper.
8. The weak bankruptcy regime that makes liquidation of borrowers’ assets costly in the event of a default possi-
bly matters as well; see Kang and Nayar (2004) for a discussion of India’s bankruptcy regime. However, the
bankruptcy regime possibly matters less than the adverse selection problem posed by informational asymmetry
(Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig 2010). Further, the introduction of debt recovery tribunals, which evidently had a pos-
itive impact on credit disbursal by banks (Visaria 2009), partly ameliorated the problems associated with the costly
bankruptcy regime, while problems associated with informational asymmetry and firm opacity were more likely to
have persisted.
9. For a discussion of the challenges associated with cross-listing by emerging market firms in overseas capital markets,
see Temouri, Driffield, and Bhaumik (2016).
10. We are also mindful about the issue of correlation among explanatory variables included in the model specifica-
tion. However, it is stylised in the finance literature to develop model specifications on the basis of theory and the
use of correlation matrices and variance inflation factors (VIFs) to identify multicollinearity issues is not stylised.
Further, our explanatory variables are largely indicators of monetary policy and monetary regime that are, by
definition, exogenous to the firms and are also uncorrelated to firm-level variables. We have not, therefore, checked
for multicollinearity before proceeding with the estimation of the models.
11. The Sargan statistic, which is often reported, is not valid in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity, and the
Sargan statistic that is robust to heteroskedasticity is numerically equivalent to Hansen’s J statistic (Baum, Schaffer,
and Stillman 2003). Hence, for both the one-step robust estimation and all two-step estimations, it is reasonable
to report the Hansen J statistic, which is consistent in the presence of arbitrary intra-cluster correlation. While the
Hansen statistic itself can be weakened by instrument proliferation, our choice of two lags, firm age and a time trend
by construction limits instrument proliferation. As in many cases of econometric modelling, after considering the
pros and cons of alternative test statistics, we report the Hansen statistic. This is consistent with other papers within
the broad area of economics and finance (e.g., Mullahy 1997; Fisman and Svensson 2007; Li and Zhang 2007;
Cawley and Meyerhoefer 2012).
12. This is apparently at odds with Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo’s (2004) finding that there is persistent in bank lending,
such that newer firms with greater growth opportunities may find it difficult to obtain bank credit, while incumbent
firms that do not have as many opportunities to grow may continue to have access to bank credit. Note, however,
that Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo’s (2004) empirical analysis is limited by virtue of its use of a single bank’s data.
Further, given that the firms listed in the Prowess database are generally larger and stock exchange listed, they do
not necessarily capture the experiences of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that are included in data obtained
from banks.
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